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The study of religion in the Chinese context confrontssome basic problems: how relevant is the term “reli-gion,” borrowed from Western languages via Japan-
ese, in referring to the social forms examined? (1) Even if one
chooses to speak of a “religious sphere,” can Western con-
cepts turn up anything but largely misleading analogies in de-
scribing mental and social structurations, (2) even when the
concepts are specifically tailored to take Chinese realities
into account? (3) But then, which terms and what categories
should be used to consider phenomena usually classed under
Western “religious studies”? Conversely, would too narrow
a focus on lexicographical matters not lose sight of universal
elements in Chinese religious experience and manifesta-
tions, thus blocking the way to a comparative work? Further,
to what extent do official designations of authentic and “ac-
ceptable” religious forms inform or distort our perception of
Chinese religious activities in the spontaneity of social man-
ifestations? Such questions can be expanded and pursued,
illustrating the basic difficulties faced in any study of “reli-
gion in China.” Relig ion in  China:  Demography and ethnography
Regulating and controll ing  re l i giouspracti ce
It must be noted that from 1949 until now, only five religious
forms have enjoyed legal recognition, and that each of them
is “structured” by an association that acts as a conveyor belt
between civil society and the party-state whose policies and
instructions it transmits. (4) Further, the State Administration
of Religious Affairs (5) at the central, provincial, and local lev-
els functions as a sort of “ministry of religion” with extensive
powers. Right from the start of the Communist regime, “het-
erodox cults” and “superstitions,” as distinct from “religions,”
were officially banned, the former often subject to systematic
repression, as illustrated right from 1951 by the violent crack-
down on Yiguandao. This preliminary observation already
points to a framework of understanding. The system in oper-
ation introduces a double rupture, while retaining the possi-
bility of safeguarding a “continuum” for the religious sphere:
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1. Joël Thoraval, “Pourquoi les ‘religions chinoises’ ne peuvent-elles apparaître dans les
statistiques occidentales?” (Why “Chinese religions” elude Western statistics),
Perspectives chinoises, no.1, March 1992, pp. 37-44; Vincent Goossaert, “1898: The
Beginning of the End for Chinese Religion?”, Journal of Asian Studies, 65(2), 2006, pp.
307-336.
2. Liu Xiaogan, cited by Fan Lizhu, describes as  “inverse analogical interpretation”
Chinese researchers’ practice of applying a Western concept to understand their own
belief systems, thus going against the grain of Chinese philosophies right from the first
century AD, which used familiar concepts such as those of Dao to take into account
imported Buddhist notions. See Fan Lizhu, “The Dilemma of Pursuing Chinese Religious
Studies in the Framework of Western Religious Theories,” Fudan Journal of the
Humanities and Social Sciences, 2(2), June 2009, pp. 29-48, especially p. 30.
3. Fan Lizhu notes that C.K. Yang’s famous concept of diffused religion to explain the speci-
ficity of social forms among China’s religious orders has been translated into Chinese
often with the connotation of “dispersed” (sankaide), “enlarged” (kuosanxing), “spread”
(misanxing), or “distributed” (fensanxing) (Fan, art.cit., p. 38).
4. The “Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches” was founded in 1954,
the Chinese Buddhist Association in 1955, and Islamic, Daoist, and Catholic associations
in 1957. The structures may be more complex than this quick summary would suggest.
Strictly speaking, the Protestant church is formed by the “China Christian Council ”
(founded in 1980) and the aforementioned “Patriotic Committee.” The relationship
between the “official” Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association and the Chinese Catholic
Bishops Conference is of the same nature.
5. Previously known as the Bureau of Religious Affairs.
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This paper examines both the revival of religious organisations and practices in China and what could be coined the
“exit from religion” exemplified by the loss of religious basis for social togetherness and the instrumentalisation of
religious organisations and discourse. It argues that “revival” and “exit” taken as a twofold phenomenon facilitate an
understanding of the evolving and often disputed nature of China’s religious sphere throughout history as well as the
socio-political stage that the country is entering.
Religious Revival and Exit from Religion in Contemporary China
a rupture between recognised and unrecognised religious
forms (regardless of the latter’s degree of institutionalisation);
and within recognised religions, a rupture between groups
and personalities participating in structures established by the
party-state and those shunning them. However, in actuality
there is less of a rupture than a “continuum” governed by a
variety of strategies adopted by different actors as regards the
degree of their inclusion in the official apparatus (from total
integration to dissidence, with all the stages in between). 
Article 36 of the PRC Constitution (6) stipulates that: 
Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy free-
dom of religious belief. No state organ, public organi-
sation or individual may compel citizens to believe in,
or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discrim-
inate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe
in, any religion. The state protects normal religious ac-
tivities. No one may make use of religion to engage in
activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of
citizens or interfere with the educational system of the
state. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not
subject to any foreign domination. 
Public control, individual freedom of belief, designation by
the state of beliefs and their manifestations deemed “nor-
mal,” a strict national framework assigned to religious organ-
isations – such are the principles set out.
Barring the 1966-1979 period, the continuity of the regime’s
legal and ideological framework for dealing with religion pre-
vailed over the changes introduced. The legal framework was
set out in 1982, but the principles therein had been adopted
right from the early 1950s (a notable exception was the affir-
mation in 1982 that the elimination of religion was the long-
term objective). A quiet change occurred at the turn of the cen-
tury: the crackdown on “evil cults” from 1999 targeting Falun
Gong strengthened the position of state-approved religious
forms. It was a change, not rupture, to the extent that religion
had been functionalised by the Chinese government, in line
with the development of the reform and opening policy, as sub-
ordinate purveyors of morality and as part of the social frame-
work and international opening. However, while recognising
the positive social role religion could play, there was from then
onward a prudent acknowledgment of the difference between
“evil  cults” (xiejiao — assimilated into the Western world’s
“cults”) and “new religious movements” (xinxing zongjiao),
thus perhaps opening the door to a gradual softening of the cat-
egories governing religions, (7) as implied by the State Council’s
Regulations on Religious Affairs of March 2005.
The very nature of the institutional framework provided by the
relay-associations harks back to a century-old practice, with
the gradual constitution of “national” and “modern” religions:
national religious associations took shape in 1912 and were co-
opted by the state in the 1930s, (8) albeit reformatted to suit the
needs of the post 1949-regime. Thus the 1949 rupture did not
dilute the constitution of a “modern” religious sphere that
began in the late nineteenth century – but it is worth examin-
ing whether even the institutional rupture could be traced to a
time far earlier than 1949 (to 1898 (9)) in accounting for the
dynamic of the Chinese religious phenomenon.
Counting  beli evers  …
State control of religious expression does not accord with
data collection. Thus, censuses preclude questions on reli-
gious affiliation. The Chinese opinion polling organisation
Horizon Group (Lingdian jituan) conducted two surveys in
collaboration with the Pew Global Attitudes Project in
2005 and 2006, and another in 2007 with C100, a non-par-
tisan organisation of Chinese Americans. (10) However, as
city-dwellers are over-represented, (11) the results reflect the
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6. Published in March 1982, the Central Committee “Document 19” had already formulat-
ed the principles on which Article 36 is based.
7. See David A. Palmer, “Heretical Doctrines, Reactionary Secret Societies, Evil Cults:
Labeling Heterodoxy in Twentieth-Century China,” in Mayfair Mei-hui Yang (ed.), Chinese
Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation, Berkeley, University of
California Press, 2008, especially pp. 129-134. 
8. This involved creating two competing Buddhist associations by 1912, one more secular
and the other monastic; a somewhat similar situation in Daoism’s national structuring;
creation of a national Islamic association; the flowering of a tentative national organisa-
tion for Confucianism; later national structuring of Christian churches, thanks to confes-
sional divisions, foreign influences, and the strength of already existing specialised
associations. See Vincent Goossaert, “Republican Church Engineering: The National
Religious Associations in 1912 China,” in Mayfair Mei-hui Yang (ed.), Chinese
Religiosities: Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation, Berkeley, University of
California Press, 2008, pp. 209-232.
9. See Vincent Goossaert, “L’invention des ‘religions’ en Chine moderne” (Invention of ‘reli-
gions’ in modern China), in Anne Cheng (ed.), La pensée en Chine aujourd’hui (Thought
in China Today), Gallimard, Folio Essais, 2007, pp. 185-213; also Vincent Goossaert:
“1898: The Beginning of the End for Chinese Religion?”, Journal of Asian Studies, 65(2),
2006, pp. 307-336.
10. An account of the three surveys is available on pewforum.org, 2 May 2008. Analysis by
Brian J. Grim, Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life.
11. Studies on current changes in religious activities in the countryside are rarer. Given the
difficulties faced by field studies, their conclusions have to be read with caution.
Besides, Chinese researchers are at pains to explain what is behind the religious revival
in the countryside, its significance and meaning, while agreeing that such a revival is a
reality. Explanations advanced include: an organic link between economic growth and
religious expansion; the rising strength of the “four numerous groups ” (elderly, women,
uneducated, and the sick and disabled) more susceptible to religious faith; the link
between Western cultural influence and religious fervour; greater engagement by reli-
gions in the secular sphere; and confusion between religion and superstition. See Dong
Jianbo and Li Xuechang, “Zhongguo nongcun zongjiao xinynag de bianqian”
(Transformations in religious belief in the Chinese countryside), Shanghai Xinzhengyuan
xuebao (Journal of Shanghai Administrative Institute), September 2004, 5 (5), especial-
ly pp.102-103.
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
Spec i a l  Fea tu re
views of about half of China’s adults. Six cities and their im-
mediate surroundings were surveyed in 2005 and 2006, and
seven in 2007. In the 2006 poll, 31 percent of those ques-
tioned said religion was “very or quite important in (their)
life,” with 11 percent affirming that it was “not at all impor-
tant.” The 2005 poll, with a somewhat differently framed
question, produced a higher percentage (56 percent) of peo-
ple who considered religion very or quite important to them. 
In the three surveys, between 14 percent and 18 percent of
those polled admitted they subscribed to a religion. By way
of comparison, another study by researchers from the East
China Normal University in Shanghai, published in China
Daily, (12) showed that 31.4 percent of those aged 16 years
and older, or about 300 million people, were religious. This
finding was interesting because for the first time, a state-con-
trolled media outlet cited a figure other than the one habit-
ually trotted out, namely 100 million. (13)
The three surveys by the Horizon Group found Buddhists
were the largest religious group in China – between 11 and
16 percent of the adult population. The surveys also con-
firmed the Chinese people’s extreme reluctance to identify
themselves as “Daoist”: less than one percent of those
polled said they belonged to that religion. Fewer than 4 per-
cent of those polled said they were Christians. A hesitation
to admit adherence to groups or churches that lack official
recognition suggests that the real figures could be higher
(the effect of over-representation of urban areas in the polls
is more difficult to gauge). The questions in the 2005 poll
included some on “personal belief” in “fortune” (yun) (40
percent of positive responses (14)), “Buddha” (8 percent) and
“Lord Jesus (shangdi Yesu)” (6 percent). These responses
do not seriously contradict others with regard to adherence:
a higher percentage of people declaring themselves to be
Buddhist might correspond to a positive appreciation of the
morality system associated with Buddhism, which requires
no faith in any particular figure. (15) Meanwhile, belief in
“Jesus” could go without declared adherence to any church.
Considering the surveys’ combined results and margins of
error, it is conceivable that the figures are not unfounded.
The polls, however, estimate those adhering to Islam at just
below 1 percent, an under-estimation stemming from the sur-
veys’ geographic limitations. An estimation of adherence to
Islam based on ethnicity figures gives a figure of 20 million
to 23 million people – but this, too, is open to question.
A similar exercise in April and May 2005 (16) showed no differ-
ence between men and women in the interest shown in religion,
nor any significant variation by age group. (17) It also revealed a
higher interest among city-dwellers (24 percent) than among
rural folk (18 percent). (But the survey was probably limited to
the immediate surroundings of cities and to people from rural
areas living in urban areas). University graduates expressed
much greater interest (26 percent) than those with diplomas
from professional training colleges (18 percent). State and party
officials expressed the greatest interest (33 percent). In terms of
income level, the interest shown in the subject was almost iden-
tical among all categories, except for those with no fixed income
(15 percent). Interest in religion is greater in the west of China
than in the coastal provinces (30 percent in Sichuan, Qinghai,
and Gansu, and 11 percent in southeastern provinces).
Ethnographers and historians might be concerned by such fig-
ures, pointing to the artificiality of the categories used, as well
as other limitations inherent in the approach. However, their
utility is undeniable, especially when the findings are com-
bined with those from other disciplines. Below we will con-
sider the methodological issues with regard to the constitution
of the religious sphere. Meanwhile, this overview needs to be
rounded off with some details on demography and changes in
the particular forms that make up the world of religion.
… and re- counting  the faithful
In any examination of the state of active religion in China,
methodological problems over the precise breakdown of the
number of believers and assessment of the social vitality of
religious forms vary greatly according to the religion under
consideration. In Islam’s case, estimation of the number of
believers is strictly correlated in all studies with that of mem-
bers of ethnic minorities whose traditional religion is Islam. 
However, for Daoism or “popular religions” a breakdown is
impossible, both in terms of practice and due to the very na-
ture of the religious forms in question.
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12. 7 February 2007, chinadaily.com.cn.
13. Of course, this figure, often repeated since the late 1990s, could hardly have been taken
seriously, because Xinhua reported on 12 April 2006, for instance, that China had about
100 million Buddhists (xinhuanet.com. in English).
14. It is noteworthy that the 40 percent belief in chance or fortune (yun),  which is consid-
ered “manipulable,” is greater than that in destiny (ming) (29 percent), which is deemed
more difficult to overcome.
15. Surveys in Taiwan have shown adherence to Buddhism (with little correlation between
belief and practice) had weak correlation with Buddhist beliefs and practices. See Benoît
Vermander, “Le paysage religieux de Taiwan et ses évolutions récentes” (Taiwan’s reli-
gious landscape life and its recent changes), L’Ethnographie, 1995, 118, pp. 9-59.
16. Survey conducted by InterMedia. Data purchased and analysed by Pew. See
pewforum.org, 2 May 2008. The question posed is subject to multiple interpretations:
“Are you interested in the topic of religion and in the issue being discussed in the
media?” A positive response indicates neither belief nor adherence to any religion.
17. By way of contrast, the East China Normal University survey reported in China Daily on
7 February 2007 found that two-thirds of those who said they were religous were aged
between 16 and 39.
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Counting the number of Buddhists and estimating their in-
fluence poses other problems. In order to measure the extent
and limits of the “social  force” Buddhism represents in
China today, it would no doubt be justified to start with the
growth in number and quality of monastic communities.
Right from the end of the fourth century and beginning of
the fifth, the monastic community has constituted the axis
around which devotional practices are conducted, providing
a belief system and institutional continuity to Buddhism.
Temples have thus functioned as the epicentre of Bud-
dhism’s expansion throughout China: as liturgical venue, the
temple served the purpose of collective intercessor for the
community to conduct its vows and prayers, especially for
the dead. As knowledge centres, major temples promoted
the translation of the Buddhist canon into Chinese and its
interpretation over several centuries. And as the centre of
power, the temple negotiated its relationship with the nota-
bles in the locality or the Empire, although this model suf-
fered a setback during the major persecution of the ninth
century, provoked in part by the riches amassed by monastic
communities. As Erik Zürcher has observed, “Chinese Bud-
dhism thus became a mighty religious power that drew its
strength from the remarkable institution of the monastery.
Surprisingly, this major religious power was constituted with-
out any form of central direction or coordination. Chinese
Buddhism has always been a network of innumerable cen-
tres, big and small, with very different levels, the biggest pa-
tronised by the court and staffed by educated monks, the
smallest vegetating in villages with a few illiterate monks in
service. In sum, a major institutional strength combined with
astounding organisational weakness.” (18)
The reconstruction of Chinese Buddhism after the chaotic
Cultural Revolution took place around monastic institutions,
as in previous epochs. The vitality of the monasteries bears
witness to that of Buddhist practices and beliefs in the rest
of society. Interestingly, it is no doubt the second part of
Zürcher’s remark, on the organisational weakness of the
Buddhist network, that is less relevant at present, due to the
structure of the party-state. The affirmation of the Chinese
Buddhist Association’s role and the concomitant creation of
a conveyor belt between the authorities and local religions
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18. Erik Zürcher, Bouddhisme, Christianisme et société chinoise (Buddhism, Christianity and
Chinese Society), Paris, Julliard, 1990, pp. 26-27.
Moslem Hui Community in the Pi county (vicinity of Chengdu). The number of believers is strictly
correlated with that of the members of ethnic communities.
© Liang Zhun, Taipei Ricci Institute
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organisations go hand in hand with greater communication
and solidarity among different centres, big or small, which in
their entirety imbue Chinese Buddhism. In other words,
Chinese Buddhism today may form a more robust and solid
whole than it ever did in the past.
The nature and use of the monasteries’ power, as exercised
today by an elite group of young clerics immersed in the task
of reconstruction and expansion, depends greatly on the
transformation of the institutions’ economic base. The ex-
ploitation of farmland has been replaced by greater depend-
ence on donations (from abroad at first and then from local
donors), help from government agencies (especially for build-
ing construction), rituals, tourism, and charitable activities.
Generally, monks attached to a monastery receive a modest
stipend, which they seek to complement through exercise of
their liturgical talents or other means. In Tibetan monaster-
ies, at least, benefits such as a stipend or lodgings are subject
to the nature of the service rendered to the monastic commu-
nity (upkeep of premises, teaching, accounting, archival …).
However, it would be difficult to understand the current
state of Chinese Buddhism by looking at only two extreme
situations – the beginnings as a monastic community, and
the steady reconstruction of the past two to three decades.
A word on the various manifestations over the past 150
years’ history would be in order. The destruction during the
Cultural Revolution was preceded by that during the Taip-
ing rebellion (1851-1864), especially in southern China, the
traditional bastion of Buddhism. Subsequent reconstruction
coincided with a rise in internal criticism regarding the sys-
tem of training and actual (non) respect of precepts. Chi-
nese Buddhism was entering the era of aggiornamento.
Some reformist monks essentially advocated a return to an-
cient disciplines, choosing to focus on a small number of
texts and meditation practices. A little later, another line,
whose most famous representative was the monk Taixu
(1890-1947), undertook a modernisation of Buddhism mod-
elled on the methods of early twentieth century Chinese re-
publicans. The laity’s role was assured. Monastic education,
too, began following the Western university model. The es-
tablishment in the first part of the twentieth century of the
Chinese Buddhist Association, the popularisation of a “hu-
manist” or “worldly” Buddhism (renjian fojiao), contacts be-
tween monks and political leaders – all these elements influ-
enced the image of Chinese Buddhism in the post-1980 era.
At the same time, the debates that marked the 1870-1940
renaissance are to be found in the Buddhist community
today as it relates to the post-modernity of a China caught
up in ceaseless transformation.
Wutaishan is a good example of contemporary Buddhism’s
expansion as well as of the challenges it faces. In the mid-
1970s, this most celebrated of Chinese Buddhist temple-
mountains was home to just a few hundred monks. By 2006,
they numbered 5,000, and some restrictions were intro-
duced on the number of monks and nuns in residence and
as students. Official statistics show that 2.8 million people
visited Wutaishan in 2008, yielding a tourist income of 1.4
billion yuan. The number of visitors is likely to top three mil-
lion in 2009. (19) The size and vigour of the community in
charge of such an establishment, as well as the masses of
people it attracts, makes Wutaishan a reference point for a
large number of other communities that make up a social
force much greater than their numbers might suggest.
Meanwhile, a note of caution regarding statistics: While re-
taining the figure of 9,000 temples for Han Buddhists alone,
with some 70,000 monks attached to them, Christian Co-
chini’s fieldwork conducted between 2002 and 2006 in 157
of the largest monasteries in China revealed much smaller
monastic communities. (20) Most places he surveyed had 20
to 200 resident monks or nuns, averaging between 60 and
80. Only some large educational centres (such as the Putuo
temple and the Women’s Buddhist Studies Institute of Wu-
taishan) have larger numbers resident. The majority of sen-
ior monks in the monasteries were born between 1955 and
1974. Since 1995, they have been replacing a generation
born during the first years of the Republic or just before
that. Most of them retain joint responsibilities in the national
level Buddhist association or its provincial units.
Cathol ici sm between two  het erodoxies
In contrast to Buddhism, Catholicism’s standing remains very
much one of  a “marginal” religion. The strength of identity
of Catholic villages has often made them into entities isolated
from the rest of their environment, equivalent to minority eth-
nic groups (“Catholicism as ethnicity,” in Richard Madsen’s
words (21)). In cities, the network of Catholic schools and hos-
pitals that could have given the church a high visibility func-
tions in the margins of civil society and out of sight of the
state apparatus. Madsen also describes contemporary Chi-
nese Catholicism as being similar to a “heterodox reli-
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19. Robert J. Saiget, AFP, 7 July 2009.
20. Christian Cochini, Guide des temples bouddhistes de Chine (Buddhist temples in China
guidebook), Paris, Les Indes savantes, 2008. Guide to Buddhist Temples of China,
Macao, Macao Ricci Institute, Humanitas Publications Series, 2009.
21. Richard Madsen, China’s Catholics: Tragedy and Hope in an Emerging Civil Society,
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998, pp. 54-56.
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gion.” (22) The flavour of “popular religion” that characterises
Catholicism in the Chinese countryside gives it a cultural and
social mooring, but risks alienating it from Catholic “ortho-
doxy” in the ecclesiastical sense. In other words, Chinese
Catholicism is threatened by the label of “heterodoxy” in re-
lation to both the Chinese regime and the universal church.
This basic “heterodoxy” of Chinese Catholicism stems also
from its longstanding roots. The intense cultural interaction
between missionaries, the educated class, and the local pop-
ulace from the late sixteenth century onwards took shape es-
pecially in the “ritual spaces” that constituted, for instance,
funerals, and led to cultural syntheses that Nicolas Standaert
has compared to evolving products of an “interweaving” in
which different “threads” (texts, nature of ritual objects, mu-
sical and devotional practices, the calendar observed...)
compose a symbolic text influenced by time and agency. (23)
At the same time, this analysis facilitates a nuanced appre-
ciation of the marginality of Catholic communities. While
they have acquired a strong identity, the often inventive and
complex manner in which their rituals have evolved over
time (for instance, funerals mixing elements of a diffused
Chinese “religion” with practices expressing articles of
Christian Credo) have helped establish “bridges” to other
ritual communities. (24) Chinese Catholic communities are
distinctive, but they are no “strangers” to the forms and sen-
sitivities of Chinese religiosity taken in its transversality.
Today, an analysis based on a series of estimates yields the
figure of an official Catholic church of 5.3 million and an un-
derground church made up of between 12 and 14 million.
The level of “service” offered varies greatly, given that the
official church has about 1,900 priests, and the clandestine
church perhaps 1,200. The difference would be even greater
for the number of adherents and seminarians. The number
of baptisms announced by the dioceses appears to have risen
in 2008 and 2009, especially in areas hit by the May 2009
earthquake. (25) This growth should not divert attention from
latent crises: rural Catholicism’s future depends on the resist-
ance of the type of sociability associated with this social
structure. In cities, traditional Catholicism suffers from ongo-
ing cultural changes. Mgr. Aloysius Jin Luxian, the Bishop
of Shanghai, noted in a pastoral letter in December 2007 (26)
the weak numerical growth of Catholicism compared to the
Protestant churches. (27) He traced the cause to a lack of mis-
sionary zeal among the laity, who still regard evangelism as
the domain of the clergy (priests and nuns). Meanwhile, the
latter have been displaying a growing addiction to television
and the Internet, according the bishop. The real issue here
is the inadequacy of the classic parish model in a contempo-
rary metropolis. Without minimising specific problems, it
can be said that Chinese Catholicism is and will be increas-
ingly affected by the crisis in governance and the societal
model of the Catholic church as a whole. The distribution
of powers and responsibilities between the faithful and cler-
ics and the latter’s standing, and the interpretation of
Catholic doctrine between tradition and modernity, are de-
bates that will also influence the vitality and relevance of the
Chinese church.
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22. See Richard Madsen, “Beyond Orthodoxy: Catholicism as Chinese Folk Religion,” in
Stephen Uhalley, Jr., and Wu Xiaoxin (eds.), China and Christianity: Burdened Past,
Hopeful Future, Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2001, pp. 233-249.There are a number of
connotations of the expressions xiejiao and xiedao. The character xie refers to all that is
perverse, unregulated, heterodox, or pernicious. In Chinese medical terms, it denotes
mainly exogenous pathogens. Although different schools of thought often trade such
expressions, xiedao and xiejiao are epithets the Confucians first used for Buddhists and,
from the seventeenth century, for Christianity, “heterodoxy” more or less standing for
subversion of intellectual tradition and political status quo.
23. Nicolas Standaert, The Interweawing of Rituals: Funerals in the cultural exchange
between China and Europe, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2008, pp.214-222.
24. Ibid., pp. 222-228.
25. China heute (China Today), 2009, 1 (161), pp.7-10. Baptism statistics (valid for the offi-
cial church only) are compiled by the Hebei-based Catholic weekly Xinde (Faith) and are
incomplete. Figures from 90 dioceses in 2009 show 22,000 baptisms between January
and April, a 14 percent rise over the previous year, with a strong growth in Chongqing
and Chengdu. Xinde, 22 April 2009, p.1; Ucannews, 28 April 2009.
26. English text in Tripod, vol. XXVIII, no. 149, Summer 2008, pp. 5-19.
27. Before 1949, Protestant churches had about 30,000 adherents in Shanghai. By 2007
they numbered about 200,000. During this period, the Catholic church saw its strength
rise from 100,000 to just 150,000. (Ibid., p.13). The pastoral letter speaks of “incom-
plete statistics,” but the figure no doubt includes some clandestine churchgoers. The dif-
ference is smaller than the gross figures might show, but the Protestant churches enjoy
clear numerical superiority.
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Front page of a liturgical Catholic calendar (year 2008). 
It is written: “Let’s pray for the Olympics”. 
© Taipei Ricci Institute 
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Protestantism: A Chinese  r e l ig ion  on the  rise?
“One is tempted to speculate that while Catholicism is a
way for rural people to shelter themselves from modernity,
Protestantism is a way to strengthen and fortify them as they
undertake a dangerous pilgrimage into modernity,” Madsen
has observed. (28) The statement errs through over-systemati-
sation. Nevertheless, Chinese Protestantism exudes a feel-
ing of empowerment and strong self-confidence, which the
faithful seem to display in daily life. In addition, lively net-
works largely transcend territorial limitations.
Estimates of the number of Protestants in China vary between
20 and 130 million, with Chinese officials themselves citing
conflicting figures. There are many varieties of groups and
modes of adherence in a configuration that in some ways re-
sembles the “nebulous” nature of Daoism and Buddhism — all
of which makes Protestantism an authentically Chinese reli-
gion. However, a more or less credible estimate is not too dif-
ficult to reach, and the crosschecking of data sheds some light.
Based on fieldwork in all provinces except Tibet, Werner
Bürklin of China Partner arrived at an estimate of 39 million
Protestants in 2007, equally divided between recognised and
unrecognised churches. The figure is close to that of the East
China Normal University. (29) Even if the figure is an underes-
timate, as many evangelical associations claim, it is based on
more rigorous data than others. Protestants and Catholics
would thus make up 4 to 5 percent of China’s population.
The distribution of churches does not represent a simple di-
vision between local communities affiliated with the Three-
Self Movement and others deemed clandestine. Don Snow
has suggested grouping the churches into five categories: (30)
(a) local congregations registered with the Chinese Christian
Council and the Three-Self Patriotic Movement; (b) legally
registered congregations that, however, do not gather in a
church but in houses or other structures; (c) groups affiliated
with a foreign denomination (Seventh Day Adventists) or
those claiming Chinese origin, groups that often meet along-
side other congregations and come together to register their
places of worship with the local office of religious affairs; (d)
“house churches,” mostly in cities, that have deliberately cho-
sen not to seek recognition from officially approved Protes-
tant organisations; and (e) largely unregistered rural groups,
often with a syncretic orientation and enterprising leadership.
Should the “prudent” estimates of Protestant numbers turn
out to have been too low, it would be a function of underes-
timating the vitality of these congregations.
Bürklin’s fieldwork and data from, among others, the Amity
Foundation, (31) also suggest a regional typology, with the
largest Protestant communities in Henan, Anhui, Zhejiang,
Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shanxi, and Shaanxi. This ge-
ographic distribution should be seen in relation to the types
of churches, with special attention to the main unregistered
groups such as the Shouters (Huhanpai), Way of Resurrec-
tion (Fuhuodao), and Society of Disciples (Mentuhui). The
number, variety, and doctrinal inventiveness of such groups
is undeniably a striking feature of the Chinese religious do-
main. In several respects, these groups may seem successors
of the “heterodox cults” of previous centuries. A sharper ap-
preciation of their regional roots would no doubt suggest re-
vealing links that fix contemporary Protestantism in Chinese
religious history.
If this analysis were extended to Daoist associations, to man-
ifestations of popular religion, to the rites and beliefs of mi-
nority nationalities, and to new or para-religions, the conclu-
sion would only be strengthened: the undeniable vitality of
the Chinese religious scene goes hand in hand with the mul-
tiplicity of communal forms and degrees of adherence. They
combine a marked “localism” with tendencies observable
globally; institutional religious forms find their place in Chi-
nese society while continuing to maintain complex relations,
buffeted by and ill at ease with the structures of the party-
state. Institutional, demographic, and confessional studies
lead quite naturally from a study of “Chinese religions” to an
attempt to interpret “China’s religious domain” in its entirety.Logic  of  the  r el ig ious
The specificities of the Chinese case do not mean that, in
principle, the categories of Western religious sociology are
not applicable. A new generation of Chinese sociologists
has even argued for their relevance, if only to sharpen or en-
rich their usage. (32) They have thus made a break with C.K.
Yang’s generation, which applied to Chinese religions more
general categories from the sociological tradition than those
of religious sociology in the strict sense. (33) Meanwhile, it is
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33. While Joachim Wach is associated with the famous distinction between informal and
institutional religions, the initial concept can be traced to Talcott Parsons, as C.K. Yang
has indicated in his brief preface. See Religion in Chinese Society, Taipei, SMC
Publishing, 1994 (1961), pp. iii and 294.
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true that both the methods of the sociology of religions and
Chinese religious life have evolved considerably. 
A fragmented market  fo r r e l ig ion
Among these attempts, one merits detailed consideration:
using a schema developed by Stark and Finke, (34) Yang
Fenggang applies the “religious market” theory to contempo-
rary China (35) — one featuring a range of activities, real and
potential adherents, organisations seeking long-term adher-
ence and control of adherents, and a religious culture offered
by these organisations. A country’s market is influenced by
the degree and modes of regulation or deregulation of the re-
ligious sphere adopted by the state, the interaction between
market and regulation norms creating a religious economy. 
Yang’s main thesis is that the type of regulation adopted by
the Chinese state has led to the constitution of three reli-
gious markets (or to the fragmentation of the combined reli-
gious market into three specific ones), which he labels “red,”
“black,” and “grey.” The red market includes organisations,
beliefs, and activities enjoying state approval and obeying its
directives. The black market is the exact opposite of the first,
operating illegally. The grey market is defined above all by
the legal ambiguity of its operation. It can be divided into
two sub-combinations: (a) illegal activities of legally recog-
nised organisations (evangelism carried out house-to-house
or under cover of social services provided by groups under
the Protestant or Catholic patriotic associations, for in-
stance); (b) religious activities carried out under other pre-
texts, such as scientific or cultural (quasi religions, “folk-
loric,” popular or “health” practices, reconstruction of tem-
ples, or resurrection of traditional religious forms in south-
eastern China). Restrictions on the red market and dangers
associated with the black market inevitably lead to growth in
the grey market, Yang says. He sees the premise of this in
the Mao cult during the Cultural Revolution and initial ex-
pression in the qigong fever. (36) Yang even hazards some es-
timates: 100 million participants in the red market, 200 mil-
lion in the black market and “several hundreds of millions”
of potential adherents in the grey one, constituting the target
audience for the rebirth of informal religions and no doubt
for new religious movements should they succeed in gaining
public expression. (37)
Yang’s analysis of “Chinese religious economy” suffers from
being reduced to the dimension of mere individual actors on
the one hand and the state on the other. It also suffers from
an excessively elastic definition of the “grey market.” How-
ever, it gives a good account, for instance, of the individual
strategies of Falun Gong adherents and members of qigong
groups after 1999; qigong’s passage into the black market for
practitioners willing to pay the price of their determination;
the retreat from the religious market for others; entry into
Christianity or Buddhism for others; and the slow and cau-
tious reconstruction of a new “grey market” segment through
the recognition of qigong fitness associations (jianshen
qigong). The religious economy approach also helps concep-
tualise the Chinese paradox: on the one hand there is a
major fragmentation of religious expression caused by the
mode of state regulations; but on the other, it is worth appre-
hending the fact of Chinese religiosity in its continuity, the
choices made by individuals turning out to be (a) fluid in
their expression, according to the price they have to pay to
satisfy their latent demand and according to the changes in
regulations and their application; and (b) constant in terms
of “expressed needs,” even though the price imposed by the
state governs the level and mode of religious consumption. (38)
Pursuing this analysis, the question arises whether the reli-
gious market is itself included in a larger “market of mean-
ings” in which nationalism, “national studies” (guoxue),
sport, and art would constitute other expressions. Each
would be in competition with others and justifiable in terms
of the cost in relation to the derived satisfaction, in its turn
defined through the conviction to lead a personal life in re-
lation to the destiny of the group (natural collectivity, nation,
church, humanity… (39)). The state’s attempt to control the
“market of meanings” through the slogan of “spiritual civili-
sation” (jingshen wenming) has led to growing exasperation
on the demand side caused by inadequate supply. At the
same time, strictly religious responses to this social demand
could prove too costly for some actors. Or they might not
fully meet the expectations aroused, or further, lose value rel-
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36. Art. cit., pp. 98-99.
37. Art. cit., pp.113-114.
38. Yang has not considered the issue of a possible rise in “global demand” after the satis-
faction of material needs, or of a demand fluctuation as a function of private and public
cycles similar to those propounded by A.O. Hirschman in Shifting Involvements, Private
Interest and Public Action, Princeton University Press, 1982.
39. Paul Tillich was one of the first to thematise the inclusion of historic religions in the
sphere of meaning that modernity has extended to “secular quasi-religions.” “Religion”
in its most extended meaning thus corresponds to “the state of being seized by an ulti-
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Christianisme et les Religions, Paris, Aubier-Montaigne, 1968, pp. 65-68.
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ative to competition from new vectors of supply, the “na-
tional studies” vogue representing one example of that trend.
Towards  an integrated r e l ig ious  economy
The question that arises at this point is whether the market
paradigm sufficiently accounts for the basic phenomena de-
termining China’s “religious” sphere or whether other para-
digms could substitute for it partly or wholly. For the rest,
most ethnological studies do not give primacy to the individ-
ual agent in China’s religious market as a whole, however it
might be governed by state regulations. Individual actors’ be-
haviour and choices are in general mutually correlated
spheres. Curiously, it is the attention given to traditional
structures of local “markets,” their networking, the resilience
of trading communities and culturally endogenous communi-
ties, (40) which gives rise to “belief spheres,” often linked to
matrimonial alliances and “ritual spheres” (jisi quan (41)).
The latter are difficult to describe, as they include pilgrim-
age centres often far from local networks. In Skinner’s ap-
proach, the “sphere” by definition surpasses the village
framework. But in subsequent usage, the term is often ap-
plied to any cultural unit that can be shown to be structured
and relevant, including (perhaps) the village. (42) Neverthe-
less, it is applied more exactly to a nexus intersecting a num-
ber of communities according to a system of often complex
alliances and interests. Even in this case, the sphere is pri-
marily spatial in the sense that it raises the limits of a sym-
bolic territory, delimited and often protected by the object
and form of ritual practices.
At first glance, the description of these spheres induces ap-
prehension of the religious sphere in terms that leave little
room for the market paradigm. This is not because the indi-
vidual has a mere subordinate role, but because the range of
adherences, beliefs, and religious practices is highly limited
and boxed in — so much so that religious inventiveness and
adaptation to global changes are manifested less by replace-
ment of one “product” by another than by a logic of internal
adaptation, which often brings about profound changes to
the available religious supply without changing the original
configuration. It is a corporatist economy of the religious de-
scribed as a “sphere” or “field.”
Meanwhile, it is worth noting that the attention to “belief
spheres” could take into account phenomena of conversion.
Attention could focus on their collective character and the
manner in which conversion reinforces the local sphere and
renders it more dynamic. This, in turn, making a similar
leap, reworks its identity markers and symbols rather than
abandoning them. This phenomenon is illustrated by the di-
verse forms of rebuilding rural religious life after the Cultural
Revolution, such as Thomas DuBois has described with re-
gard to a county in Hebei. (43) The village may have an in-
tense or limited religious life, or it may house a temple or
serve as a centre for a dominant religious group descended
from “heterodox” cults of previous centuries. In all these
cases, (conversion from one religion to another, mode of re-
building the village religious identity by reinterpreting an-
cient systems), a religious choice is made, but it may seem
to be the result of collective rather than individual choice. It
is the mode of interaction in the village community and the
type of needs to be satisfied (44) that would be decisive fac-
tors of religious reconfiguration.
Ultimately the following schema might be attempted: collec-
tive actors such as the village, the guild, or devotional asso-
ciations  created a primary “religious market” that long
served as the dominant market. This once suppressed mar-
ket is now seeking its proper place. The actors negotiated
the price of religious intermediaries, (45) and left little place
for a market of individual actors. There was some elasticity
in the forms and cost of religious services within the market
segment in which they operated. Conversely, the change
from one religious form to another (conversion of a village to
Christianity, for instance) took place at a heavy cost – at any
rate, existing alternatives were limited. Meanwhile, there
was always a second religious market activated by individu-
als (or by families independent of the compulsions of the vil-
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Society: Lineage and Village in the Eastern New Territories, Hong Kong, Hong Kong and
Oxford University Press, 1986. Burton Pasternak, among others, has shown that village
rituals may or may not be factors of community cohesion and that many factors deter-
mine the place and importance of these local rituals (see Kinship and Community in Two
Chinese Villages, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972, especially pp. 109-113 and
125-127). In other words, the first question the ethnographer poses is the extent, rele-
vance, and correlation of ritual or belief spheres, without presuming the basic primacy
of this or that territorial dimension.
43. The Sacred Village: Social Change and Religious Life in Rural North China, Honolulu,
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45. On the variation in the remuneration of religious intermediaries as a function of supply
and demand, and the limited elasticity depending on the community in question, see the
examples offered by Donald S. Sutton, “Transmission in Popular Religion: The Jiajiang
Festival Troupe of Southern Taiwan,” in Meir Shaharr and Robert P. Weller (eds.), Unruly
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lage or lineage). Affiliation with a “heterodox cult,” for ex-
ample, typically occurs on an individual basis; (46) “entering
monastic life” (chu jia) was an alternative choice, migrations
accompanied changes in religious affiliations, and the
process is still ongoing… Chinese “religious economy” func-
tioned (and still does after a fashion) through multiple forms
of interaction among three actors: the state, at once market
regulator and itself in possession of a religious or quasi-reli-
gious “supply”; a group of collective actor-regulators of ritu-
als; and individual actors prone to desert one segment of the
market and set up another. Chinese researchers often assert
that the individualisation of actors is the most notable fea-
ture today, and that it is accompanied by the entry of reli-
gious activities into the market mechanism, the modernisa-
tion of religious beliefs and attitudes, and a peaceful compe-
tition between different beliefs and organisations. (47)“Exit  f rom Rel ig ion”  wi th Chinese character ist i cs
At this stage, it is possible to return to the use of the term
“religious”: does it gloss over the realities of the prefabri-
cated categories under examination, thus blocking rather
than promoting understanding?
Societies where the state has taken shape are those where
the separation of the politico-state sphere from the religious
sphere has taken place. Such, at least, is the famous thesis
of Marcel Gauchet. Space precludes discussion of all of
Gauchet’s presumptions and their implications, but a few el-
ements may help shed new light on the structuration of the
religious sphere in China. If religion is understood as the op-
eration through which a human group relates its existence to
a foundation outside of itself and on which it has no hold
other than through rite of magic (or further, as Gauchet
says, “humanity’s relation with itself under the sign of dis-
possession” (48)), the birth of politics (wherever it is not pro-
hibited through virtual choices made within “state-less soci-
eties”) progressively operates the limitation of the religious
sphere by instituting a series of mediations of society with it-
self. With the rise of the state “starts a materialisation of re-
ligious exteriority in the collective space.” (49) Later, with the
formation of the modern state (“the state in possession of its
concept”), “by separating from religion, politics came to light
and became identifiable in and of itself.” (50)
In this light, “the revolution of exit from religion” is that of
“the political condition taken on consciously.” (51) In other
words, “exit from religion” corresponds to the condition of a
group as a community capable of determining its mode of ex-
istence and its destiny solely based on the mediations im-
posed by rules of political discussion, without the interfer-
ence of sacred reference. Of course, in China, the arrival of
the political condition did not occur along the path and time-
frame that characterised the Western experience. This diver-
gence is concomitant to that observed in the structuration
and evolution in the religious sphere. But the appearance,
even if virtual, of the political condition cannot but provoke
the march towards a religious “specialisation” and eventual
loss of the religious sphere’s social effectiveness as basis of
the social bond itself. (52) While the precocious appearance
of the Chinese state quickly subordinated the religious func-
tion’s social expression to China’s own political forms, these
same political forms, for a very long time, preserved the sa-
cred basis of the social sense of togetherness. In this light, it
is no doubt inaccurate to describe the development of the
late nineteenth century as a “rupture” that artificially tipped
the Chinese “religious” sphere into Western-style “religion,”
overhauling the ethos of the former. Rather, all the histori-
cal stages preceding this moment (the emergence amid the
ruins of the Han dynasty of Daoism and Buddhism as “spe-
cialised” constituted religions, the rupture of traditional soli-
darities induced by the periodic formation of
“heterodox cults,” Confucianist reformulations, Rites contro-
versies, anti-clerical crystallisations...) could be seen in con-
tinuity. In its long history, China has clearly experienced a
gradual structuration of the religious sphere, signalling a dis-
tinction between the religious and other domains of social
activity. Not only are Chinese religions subject to perpetual
change, redefinition, and autonomisation historically, but
their involution confronts them today with the question of
the “exit from the religious sphere” in its global expression.
In other words, the Chinese state has, throughout its long
history, mobilised and constantly reformulated existing reli-
gious resources in such a manner as to create and perpetu-
ate both the self-representations of the body social and the
state’s own control over it. This fact should not prevent a di-
achronic reading of the emergence of China’s own au-
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tonomous religious forms and debates, which gradually
weakened the politico-religious link taken as the sacred basis
of social life. As in other social contexts, the weakening of
such a link facilitated the Chinese national community’s
entry into the “political condition” in the same movement
through which it effected its “exit from the religious.” This
process is far from and might never be complete. However,
understanding it remains important in order to avoid the
temptation to analyze Chinese religious evolutions only in
terms of “external ruptures” that took place during the last
60, 100 or 150 years.  
Contemporary Confucianism:  True r e l ig ionof the  exit  f rom re l i gion?
Contemporary Confucianism offers an example of what is at
stake here. By the late nineteenth century, the spread of
Western knowledge, epistemological categories (science, re-
ligion, politics), and social institutions (universities,
churches, the press, and parties) challenged Confucianism’s
self-image as a complete ritual, sapiental, and cosmological
system as well as the foundation of China’s social and cul-
tural order. (53) Attempts to save the universality of Confucian
teaching (jiao) were followed by its republican reformula-
tions, either as religion (conceived in relation to and con-
trasting with Christianity, religion’s epistemic model), or as
philosophy, again in a tense relationship with Western tradi-
tion. After the Maoist storm, Confucian “reconstruction” –
in parallel and competing with religious reconstruction –
passed through different stages and strategies. Researchers
have found the vitality of a “popular Confucianism” organ-
ised around temple lineages (citang), serving as providers of
continuity and communal harmony. The rise of China and
the Asian Tigers has stoked lively debate over the socio-eco-
nomic effectiveness of Confucian wisdom. The national,
even nationalist, affirmation has taken the form of a still
growing body of reinterpretations of the Confucian canon,
addressing varied publics but aimed at a still larger fringe of
the Chinese population. A corollary question arises of Con-
fucianism’s “religious nature”: a number of systems are flour-
ishing with the aim of clarifying its ultimate nature and so-
cial function and its desirable incorporation into legal struc-
tures. The essential aspect of this deep-seated movement for
social and intellectual reconstruction is that it is offered as an
alternative to the Western categories that had triumphed in
the late Qing period. It also questions the demarcations
erected between science, philosophy, wisdom, and reli-
gion, (54) the university’s monopoly over dispensation of
knowledge, and the functionalisation of a political space con-
ceived independently of the national tradition it inhabits.
These scattered and inchoate attempts are meant to assert
Confucianism’s religious value and at the same time contest
the way in which the West has imposed on China’s ancient
social and cosmological order its own divisions of different
levels of existence and knowledge. It is a contemporary refor-
mulation that clearly would not lead to the revival of a bygone
and largely imagined past, but the question is whether it
would not install Confucianism as the Chinese religion of the
exit from religion to the extent that Confucianism is meant to
anchor the social link in transcendence. (55) This transcen-
dence is inscribed in an interpretation of Chinese national
and cultural history combining the specificity of its humanist
contribution and the demand for a kind of universal knowl-
edge of the nature of man and his capacities to surpass him-
self. But it is a religion of the exit from religion to the extent
that the Confucian model of knowledge and action contests
the distinctions established by the West (and even by the In-
dian world) among sciences, religion, and other domains of
social practice on the one hand, and the forms and meanings
of rituals commonly qualified as “religious” on the other. It is
therefore the synthesis already suggested in his time by Con-
fucius (criticism of the religious accompanied by an accom-
modation to it), and reformulated after the intellectual en-
counter with the West, paradoxically projecting Confucian-
ism in the era of post-modernity. In this logic, whereas Chris-
tian tradition had led to a long and tiresome route through its
forms and its essence to an “exit from religion,” Confucian-
ism overcame right from its first principles the historic stage
of “the religious as the basis of social relationship.” This was
accomplished while furnishing meaningful resources to main-
tain a quasi-sacred basis of social relationships – something
the post-modern West is not yet able to ensure.
The instrumentali sation of  re l igion
Another example of “the exit from religion” in China is par-
adoxically provided by the appeals made to religions by the
rulers and the ruled. The henceforth total absence of a basis
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transcending the social (a basis that Maoism had sought to
promote) makes religions into auxiliary dispensers of a “har-
mony” they can no longer ensure through their rituals and
social mooring. Failing that, religions “fabricate” harmony in
the style of a theoretical “construct,” i.e., of a reinterpreta-
tion of their traditions guided by the imperatives of a regime
concerned with better managing ongoing social transforma-
tions. Thus, some scholars have suggested that it would not
be absurd to speak of a “conversation” in the long run be-
tween Protestant and state-party leaders. (56) Protestant
churches’ preoccupation right from the Republican era with
participating in the construction of a modern state, the per-
sonality and influence of bishop K.H. Ting, (57) details of ne-
gotiations as to methods of managing religious affairs after
1980, and the theological construction around notions of
harmony or of socialism, show an intensity of interaction that
has also contributed to the Chinese state’s modernisation.
At the same time, it is precisely this intensity that has height-
ened Chinese Protestantism’s internal divisions. It is an ex-
ample of the reinterpretation and secularisation of religious
doctrines in line with national contexts. Such an analysis
could apply, for instance, to the constructions of renjian fo-
jiao (worldly Buddhism) to the extent that it offers a mode
of civility attesting to the social relevance of the tradition
thus reinterpreted. 
Thus the forms that Chinese religious revival takes often
equate to nostalgia for the politico-religious basis of social re-
lationships – religions today being susceptible to instrumen-
talisation precisely because religion does not offer the sacred
anchoring for communal life. From this fact alone, the reli-
gious revival in China may be interpreted in terms of a his-
toric transition: of the country’s hesitation on the threshold
of an autonomisation of politics — such is the abiding
strength of efforts to anchor social relationship in a sacred
reference.
In a context marked by both continuing state control and the
state’s lost hold over forms and categories of the religious
sphere, the religious burgeoning is both a  possible prelude
to and present substitute for democratisation (or at any rate,
autonomisation of civil society). The growing instrumentali-
sation of Chinese religions is accompanied by the loss of all
religious basis for social relationships, ushering China into
the era of “exit from religion,” although such a process re-
mains unfinished and contradictory. Protestantism and Bud-
dhism, among other religious expressions, now entertain am-
bitions to serve as the local and global expressions of a reli-
gious sphere that is no longer the foundation but rather the
auxiliary to social relationships. At the same time, a recon-
stituted Confucianism aspires to become the complete reli-
gious form of the exit from religions. Clearly, the study of re-
ligious changes in China today is more than a simple ethno-
graphic exercise. When put into context, it can provide a
valuable contribution to our understanding of evolving forms
of communal life in national societies facing the emergence
of a global community whose unique foundation is the des-
tiny it decides for itself. •
• Translated by N. Jayaram
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Glossary
chujia 出家  citang 祠堂  fang 放  fensanxing 分散性 
fuhuodao 復活道  guiyi 皈依  guoxue 國學
hanyu shenxue 漢語神學  hehe 和合  hehexue 和合學
hexie 和諧  huhanpai 呼喊派
jianshen qigong 健身氣功  jiao 教  jingsheng wenming 精神文明
jisi quan 祭祀圈  jushi 居士  kuosanxing 擴散性  lixue 理學
mentuhui 門徒會  ming 命  misanxing 彌散性  qishi 啟示
renjian fojiao 人間佛教  sankaide 散開的  shangdi yesu 上帝耶穌
sheng sheng bu xi 生生不息  shou 收  wu 悟  xiedao 邪道
xiejiao 邪教  xinxing zongjiao 新興宗教  yiguandao 一貫道
yun 運  zhihui 智慧  zhizhe 智者
